Abstract: A substantial body of evidence now supports the idea that mnemonic experiences are not solely a property of stored memory traces, and that such experiences are at least in part a product of unconscious inferences that utilize a variety of different cues (e.g., perceptual fluency). In this talk, I will illustrate how such inferences shape experiential aspects of memory, and apply this general framework to our understanding of how we monitor what we know and don’t know (i.e., metamemory). In particular, I will focus on how many different metamnemonic experiences and judgments, including feelings-of-knowing and judgments of learning, similarly involve inferential processes, as well as discuss some of the challenges involved in studying these processes.
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